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THE GENE PATENTING CONTROVERSY:
A CONVERGENCE OF LAW,
ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND ETHICS*
Daniel J. Kevlest & Ari Berkowitz"

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial issues in biotechnology in
the United States and Europe has been the patenting of
human DNA sequences and human genes. The medical,
pharmaceutical, and economic interests at stake are huge,
making investments in biotechnology firms involved in gene
patenting highly volatile. President Bill Clinton and Prime
Minister Tony Blair recently applauded the commitment by
scientists "to release raw fundamental information about the
human DNA sequence and its variants rapidly into the public
domain."1 Investors, taking the communique as a declaration
against gene patenting, sold off biotechnology shares as though
they were post-Bolshevik Russian bonds.2
This Article will examine first how and why gene
patenting became controversial, showing that the disputes are
partly familiar to the extent that they are contests of political
©2001 Daniel J. Kevles & Ari Berkowitz. All Rights Reserved.
t Department of History, Yale University.
ftDepartment of Zoology, University of Oklahoma.
1Declan Butler, US/UK Statement on Genome DataPromptsDebate on "Free
Access," 404 NATURE 324 (2000).

2 For example, the closing price of Human Genome Sciences on Friday,
March
10, 2000 was $172 1 per share. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at C25. On March 14, 2000,

the stock closed at $123"

per share. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at C22. Celera

Genomics Group closed at $202 118 on March 10, 2000 and at $155 on March 14, 2000.
CBS MarketWatch, at http://cbs.marketwatch.com. See generally Alex Berenson &
Nicholas Wade, A Call for Sharing of Research Causes Gene Stocks to Plunge, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at Al.
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economy among individuals, companies, and governments over
what constitutes allowable intellectual property rights. But
this Article will then show that the contest has raised issues
that have been, for the most part, historically unfamiliar in
patent policy-ethics. The controversy over gene patenting has
swirled most turbulently around the claim that granting
private intellectual property rights in parts of the human
genome violates a moral code because the genome, the common
program for human life, belongs to us all.
BACKGROUND: THE PATENTING OF LIFE

I.

The patenting of life was first formally contested in the
3 made
United States when the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty
4
its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The case had been brought
by Ananda Chakrabarty against the U.S. Patent Office after it
denied him a patent on a bacterium that he had engineered to
consume hydrocarbons. 5 The Patent Office argued that no
patent could be issued on a living organism because it was a
product of nature.' But in 1980, the Court held, by the slim
margin of five to four, that whether the invention was alive or
dead was irrelevant, that the bacterium was not a product of
nature, that it was a product of Chakrabarty, and hence
deserved a patent.7
After the Chakrabarty ruling, several critics insisted
that the decision appeared to leave no legal obstacle to the
patenting of higher forms of life-such as plants, animals, and
possibly human beings-or, by implication, to the genetic
engineering of such life forms.' In fact, although the Patent
Office later held that human beings could not be patented,9
American patents were awarded during the 1980s on a plant
3 447 U.S. 303, 305-18 (1980).
4 Daniel J. Kevles, Ananda Chakrabarty Wins

a Patent: Biotechnology,
Law, and Society, 1972-1980, 25 HIST. STUD. IN THE PHYSICAL & BIOL. SCIS. 111, 11136 (1994).
5

Id.

6Id.
7 Id.
8 Daniel J. Kevles, Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Beyond: The Political
Economy of PatentingLife, in PRIVATE SCIENCE: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF THE
MOLECULAR SCIENCES 65, 65-79 (Arnold Thackray ed., 1998).
9Id.
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and a mouse."0 Patents were also allowed on human genes with
a known function-for example, the gene for insulin-in a form
that did not occur naturally but that had been derived from
natural DNA by scientific manipulation." Called "cDNA"-short for "complementary DNA"-genes in such form were
patentable because they were not products of nature. As a
result, by the end of the 1980s, the new biotechnology industry
was flourishing in the United States, energized by venture
capital willing to invest heavily in firms that could patent
genetically modified organisms and genes themselves. In
contrast, the European Community provided no patent
protection for living organisms or their genes. 2 Fearing for the
competitiveness of the Community in the industrialization of
molecular biology, the European Commission proposed a
biotechnology directive in 1988 that would authorize the
patenting of life. The European Parliament, however, was
unwilling to concur in the initiative, partly on ethical
grounds."

II.

PATENTING EXPRESSED SEQUENCE TAGS

In the 1990s, J. Craig Venter, a biologist at the National
Institutes of Health ("NIH"), in Bethesda, Maryland, suddenly
raised the stakes in the patenting of life by proposing the
wholesale patenting of human gene fragments. Venter's lab,
using automated machines, had sequenced not whole genes but
random fragments of cDNA derived from part of the brain."
Such a fragment was called an "expressed sequence tag," or
EST. 5 Although just 150 to 400 DNA coding pairs long, each

10 Id.

" STEPHEN HALL, INVISIBLE FRONTIERS: THE RACE TO SYNTHESIZE A HUMAN

GENE (1987).

12 David

Dickson, European ParliamentRejects Bid to Stem Confusion Over

Gene Patents,374 NATURE 103 (1995).
13

Id.

D. Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed
Sequence Tags and Human Genome Project, 252 SC. 1651, 1651 (1991); Christopher
Anderson, US PatentApplicationStirs Up Gene Hunters, 353 NATURE 485, 485 (1991).
"'See authority cited supranote 14.
14Mark
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was unique and served to identify the gene of which it was a
on 315
part.16 In June 1991, Venter and NIH filed for patents
17
came.
they
which
from
genes
human
the
and
ESTs
Venter's patent ambitions seemed boundless. His lab
could churn out EST sequences so quickly that NIH planned to
file patent applications for 1000 of them a month. 18 At that
rate, it would not be too long before he had locked up a
substantial fraction of the 100,000 genes then estimated to
comprise the human genome."9 Indeed, by 1994 the number of
ESTs covered by the Venter/NIH application had multiplied to
almost 7,000.20
A number of patent experts, however, insisted that
ESTs were not patentable. 1 In the United States, an
invention's eligibility for a patent depends in part on it being
"nonobvious" and possessing "utility," useful in some way. But
the task of finding ESTs is obvious to practitioners in the field.
Venter did claim that the ESTs would have utility as
diagnostic probes for detecting gene expression in specific cell
types and as markers for mapping the locations of genes on the
chromosomes of human DNA." However, his gene fragments
revealed nothing about the utility of the full gene in the bodythat is, its function or malfunction. He nevertheless seemed
bent on using the fragments to gain control of the intellectual
property in the entire gene that the EST identified. His patent
strategy was comparable to claiming copyright ownership in an
undescribed painting on the basis of having just a sliver of the

'6 See authority cited supra note 14.
17j. Craig Venter & Mark Adams, Sequences, USPTO No. 07/716,831, at 23536 (applied June 20, 1991).
18Id.
19Venter once explained himself, "Iturned 21 in Vietnam. So, in that situation,
I saw that there is too little time in life to waste on B.S. approaches. So, in that sense, I
am impatient. I want to constantly be moving forward with the discovery of new
things, and I'm frustrated with how long it takes new ideas to become part of the
general thinking." Karen Young Kreeger, Genome InvestigatorCraig Venter Reflects on
Turbulent Past and Future Ambitions, 9 THE SCIENTIST 1 (1995).
20 Christopher Anderson, NIH Drops Bid For Gene Patents, 263 ScI., 909, 90910 (1994).
21 See Leslie Roberts, Genome PatentFightErupts, 254 SCI. 184, 185
(1991).
22See Venter & Adams, supra note 17.
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canvas. A lawyer for the leading biotechnology firm Genentech
noted, "If these things are patentable, there's going to be an
enormous cDNA arms race."2
Venter's initiative also provoked denunciations from
scientists anxious that his EST patents, if issued, would close
off research by others on countless human genes. Academic
biologists called EST patenting a terrible idea--"like trying to
patent the periodic table," one fumed.' A lawyer and medical
ethicist at Boston University snapped, "This is not science.
This is like the gold rush."' James D. Watson, a Nobel laureate
for his work on DNA and, at the time, head of the NIH genome
project, declared cDNA patenting "outrageous"' and "sheer
lunacy,"27 adding that "virtually any monkey"2 could perform
this type of research. Watson argued, "What is important is
interpreting the sequence. . . . If these random bits of
sequences can be patented, I am horrified."29 In April 1992,
Watson resigned as head of the genome project, explaining that
he was unalterably opposed to the NIH attempts to patent
ESTs. 30
Response in the Biotechnology Industry and From
Abroad

A.

The prospect of EST patenting split the biotechnology
industry. The Association of Biotechnology Companies in
Washington, D.C., which spoke for 280 companies and
institutions, endorsed EST patenting by NIH so long as it did
not favor any one company over another, for example by
granting an exclusive license.1 Still, many of the opponents of
Anderson, supranote 14, at 485.
2 id.
25 DArcy Jenish, A Patent on Life: Scientists Seek Legal Rights to Genes, 105
2See
4

MAcLEAN'S, 38-39 (1992).
2Anderson, supra note 14, at 485.
2Roberts, supra note 21, at
184.
2Id.
2

Id.
30 Michael Waldholz & Hilary Stout, A New Debate Rages Over the Patentingof
Gene Discoveries, THE WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1992, at 1. Watson, however, was also
under fire for conflict of interest, since he owned shares in biotech companies and
refused to sell them.
31 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257
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EST patenting were upset by the prospect that the
government-through NIH-would own those patents. 2 The
Industrial Biotechnology Association ("IBA"), representing
companies that accounted for eighty percent of U.S. investment
in biotechnology, contended that it would be "unfair to permit
the Government to exercise complete control over a product to
whose development the Government contributed little."3
Richard Godown, president of the IBA, predicted that the
commercial possibilities would be clouded "if somebody spends
a lot of time and money to discover the whole gene and its
function, and then discovers they've got to deal with somebody
who owns a patent to part of it."34 The Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association also opposed the NIH patent
venture, declaring that "a governmental policy of ownership
and licensing of gene sequences would inevitably impede the
research and development of new medicines in this country.""
Abroad, France, Italy, and Japan announced their
opposition to NIH's EST patents, fearing the patents would
competitively disadvantage their budding biotechnology
enterprises.36 Echoing Watson, the French Academy of Sciences
condemned "any measure which, answering purely to a logic of
industrial competition, strove to obtain the legal property of
genetic information data, without even having taken care to
characterize the genes considered."3 7 However, the British
Minister of Science Alan Howarth chose to join the
competition, announcing in March 1992 that the Medical
Research Council would also seek cDNA patents.3 8 Howarth
explained that "a decision . . . not to seek patents when
researchers funded by public bodies in other countries have or
may do so could place the UK at a relative disadvantage."39
Sci. 903, 903-08 (1992); ABC Statement on NIH Patent Filing for the Human Genome
Patent, Biotechnology Law Report, July-Aug. 1992, at 408-410.
32Id.
3Id.

34See Jenish, supra note 25, at
39.

asEisenberg, supra note 31, at 907.
3GNorton D. Zinder, PatentingcDNA 1993: Efforts and Happenings, 135 GENE
295, 295-98 (1993).
37ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Paris Bilingual Report No. 32, The Patentability of
the Genome (Lavoisier: Paris, 1995).
38Anna Maria Gillis, The Patent Questionof the Year, 42 BIOSCIENCE 336, 33639 (1992).
39Id.
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The mounting controversy was defused when in August
1992, the U.S. Patent Office rejected the Venter/NIH claims,
calling them "vague, indefinite, misdescriptive, inaccurate and
incomprehensible."0 In the agency's judgment, the patents
failed to meet the standard for "nonobviousness" and the
related standard of novelty.4 NIH filed an amended patent
application which was also rejected. Then, in February 1994,
Harold Varmus, a Nobel laureate and the new director of NIH,
announced that the agency was withdrawing its patent
application on all ESTs, explaining that such patents were "not
in the best interests of the public or science.4 243In Britain, the
Medical Research Council quickly followed suit.
B.

Venter Raises the Stakes

The Venter/NIH application, however, had let the genepatent genie out of the bottle, and Venter himself was of no
mind to stuff it back inside. In July 1992, he had announced
that he was leaving the NIH to head a new private, nonprofit
research center called The Institute for Genomic Research
(TIGR), to be located in Maryland near NIH." TIGR received a
ten-year grant of seventy million dollars from a New Jersey
venture
capital group called Healthcare
Investment
Corporation, which had already created several biotech
companies. 45 The chair of Healthcare Investment Corporation,
Wallace Steinberg, asserted that American scientists needed to
patent genes before their European and Japanese competitors
beat them to it.46 While TIGR itself would be nonprofit,
Steinberg established Human Genome Sciences Inc. ("HGS") to

40Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents,Round Two, 255 SCI. 912, 912-13 (1992);
James Martinell, USPTO, Art Unit 1805, Examiner's Action on Venter et al., Patent
Application No. 07/807,195, Aug. 20, 1992, BIOTECHNOLOGY LAW REPORT, Sept.- Oct.
1992, at 578-96.
41 Christopher Anderson, NIH cDNA Patent Rejected; Backers Want to
Amend
Law, 359 NATURE, 263 (1992).
42 Anderson, supra note 20, at
909-10.
43Id.
4 Christopher Anderson, Controversial NIH Genome Researcher Leaves
for
$70-Million Institute, 358 NATURE 95 (1992).
45 Id.
4G6
Id
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develop and market products resulting from TIGR's research.4 7
Venter took thirty NIH researchers with him and said TIGR
would "do the genome project," beginning with a scaled-up
continuation of his project to sequence random ESTs.48 He
predicted that TIGR would track down 1,000 genes daily and
would identify the majority of human genes within three to five
years.
Venter initially claimed that neither TIGR nor HGS
would file patent applications for ESTs with unknown
function.49 He said he had supported the NIH patent
application only because it stimulated debate and had actually
hoped that the patent would not be issued." A prospectus for
HGS, however, indicated that the company had filed patent
applications for almost 10,000 ESTs. Several other companies
had also submitted EST applications, including Incyte
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which filed for protection on more than
40,000 ESTs and said that it planned to file as many as
100,000 each year.51 The EST arms race was on.
C.

Ethical Obligations to Gene Patenting

Ethical objections to gene patenting cropped up in
Congressional hearings in 1992, but their roots went back more
than a decade to the Chakrabarty case. During arguments in
the case, vigorous objection to Chakrabarty's claim had come
from the People's Business Commission ("PBC"), an activist
group headed by Jeremy Rifkin.52 Rifkin was a social agitator
and sleepless critic of biotechnology. The PBC's dissent was
partly economic-patents on living organisms would foster
monopoly in vital areas such as the food industry. It was quasireligious, too, holding that "the essence of the matter"was that
47Id.
48

Id.

49 The Genome Project: The Ethical Issues of Gene Patenting, Hearing
before

the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99" Cong. 102-1134 (1992) (Statement of J. Craig Venter, NIH) [hereinafter
Genome Project Hearing]; Christopher Anderson, NIH to Appeal PatentDecision, SCI.,
259, 302 (1993).
50 Christopher Anderson, U.S. to Seek Gene Patents in Europe, 357 NATURE
525
(1992).

" Anderson, supra note 49, at 302; Anderson, supra note 42, at 910.
52 Daniel J. Kevles, Unholy Alliance, THE SCIENCES (Sept./Oct. 1986) at 25-30.
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to permit patents on life was to imply that "life has no 'vital' or
sacred property," that it was only "an arrangement of
chemicals, or mere 'compositions of matter.' "" In its ruling on
the case, the Supreme Court majority took note of these and
other apprehensions, observing that they "present a gruesome
parade of horribles" and "that, at times, human ingenuity
seems unable to control fully the forces it creates."54 The
majority observed, however, that genetic research with its
attendant risks would likely proceed with or without patent
protection for its products and that neither legislative nor
judicial fiat as to patentability would "deter the scientific mind
from probing into the unknown any more than Canute could
command the tides."55
III.

ETHICAL OBJECTIONS TO GENE PATENTING

With the subsequent patenting of animals, the ethical
objections to the patenting of life became more charged,
enlisting animal rights activists, environmentalists, and
clerics.56 Once Venter put ESTs on the patent agenda, Rifkin
and his allies contended that human genes, even those fully
characterized as to composition and function, should not be
patented at all." At Senate hearings on ethical issues in 1992,
Andrew Kimbrell, the policy director and attorney for Jeremy
Rifkin's Foundation on Economic Trends, the successor to the
PBC, argued in favor of a moratorium on gene patenting,
saying, "We are right in the middle of an ethical struggle on
the ownership of the gene pool."" He declared that Congress
should "intercede to decide where this ethical and legal free-fall
ends. 59
Brief of Amicus Curiae People's Business Commission, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (No. 79-136).
"Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305-18.
Id. at 305-18.

Kevles, supranote 8, at 65-79.
5' Ted Peters, PatentingLife: Yes, 63 First Things, MONTHLY J. RELIGION &
PUB. LIFE 18-20 (1996).
58 The Genome Project: The Ethical Issues of Gene Patenting, Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99' Cong. 102-1134 (1992) [hereinafter Genome Project Hearing]
(Statement by Andrew Kimbrell).

59Id.
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Congress, its eye on the economic and medical potential
of biotechnology, was unwilling to do anything of the sort.
Patent attorneys, biotech representatives, and several
congressmen warned that restrictions or a moratorium on the
patenting of life or its parts would put the United States at a
competitive disadvantage internationally and impede research
on cures and therapies for disease." Moreover, advocates of
biotechnology insisted on distinguishing between issues of
political economy and issues of ethics.61 The former had a place
in disputes over patent policy; the latter, at least in the United
States, did not, even though they might be legitimate in
principle. The appropriate venues for considering ethical issues
were the legislative and regulatory arenas of government, not
the Patent Office.62
Rifkin nevertheless maintained an ethical enfilade
against gene patenting, finding allies among clerics, feminists,
and whoever else might feel threatened or offended by private
ownership of the gene pool. In 1995, prompted by his
Foundation on Economic Trends, several prominent clerics
announced at a press conference in Washington, D. C. that a
coalition of 180 religious leaders representing eighty
denominations had joined Rifkin's group in signing a joint
appeal opposing the patenting of human genes and genetically
altered animals. 3 Richard Land, President of the Christian
Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, declared
that "the patenting of human genetic material attempts to
wrest ownership from God and commodifies human biological
materials and, potentially, human beings themselves."'
The next year, Rifkin mobilized women's rights leaders
against attempts to patent genes implicated in breast cancer,
claiming that such efforts represented an "assault on women"
and "denies them control over the most intimate aspect of their
being, their bodies' genetic blueprint."65 He said that a coalition
60Genome Project Hearing, supranote 58 (Statements by David Beier, Senator
Pete V. Domenicia, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, and William Noonan).
rl Genome Project Hearing, supra note 58 (Testimony of William D. Noonan).
62 Id.
Peters, supra note 57, at 18.

64Richard D. Land & C. Ben Mitchell, PatentingLife: No, 63 FIRST THINGS 20,

20-22 (1996).
5US

Coalition Counters Breast Gene Patents, 381 NATURE 265 (1996).
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would petition the Patent Office to challenge claims that had
been filed on the breast cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2.
Rifkin's statements were endorsed by members of women's
health organizations in sixty-nine countries, including Betty
Friedan, Gloria Steinem, and Bella Abzug, the former member
of Congress and herself a breast cancer survivor.6 Abzug
averred, "Human genes are not for sale or profit. Any attempt
to patent human genetic materials by individuals, scientific
corporations, or other entities is unacceptable."67
IV.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION INITIATIVES

All the while, the European Commission had continued
its attempt to promulgate a biotechnology directive that the
European Parliament would find acceptable. Resolution of
their differences had to take ethics into account. According to
article 53a of the European Patent Convention, patents that
violated "public order and morality" were inadmissible. 68 Thus
in Europe, unlike in the United States, by law ethical issues
enjoyed a seat at the table of patent policymaking. The
Commission's effort had been repeatedly blocked by ethical
opposition to patenting life from -members of the Green Party
and their 69
sympathizers, among others, in the European
Parliament.
In 1994, the Commission presented the Parliament with
a new compromise draft directive that allowed the patenting of
human genes provided that "they cannot be linked to a specific
individual."' Willy Rothley, of Germany, the head of the effort
to find suitable language for the directive in the Parliament,
considered this provision an adequate constraint, declaring,
"The European Parliament has been able to impose an ethical
dimension on patent rights and has been able to obtain most of
"Id.; Eliot Marshall, Rifkin's Latest Target: Genetic Testing, 272 SCi. 1094
(1996).

supranote 66, at 1094.
"Select Committee on the European Communities, Patent protection for
biotechnological inventions, United Kingdom House of Lords, Session 1993-94, 4th
report.
69David Dickson, British MPs 'Likely to Oppose Gene Patents," 373 NATURE
550 (1995).
70
7Marshall,

Id.
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the guarantees that it was asking for."7' However, Linda
Bullard of the European Green Party, countered: "We feel that
Parliament, having voted previously against patents on parts
of
the
human
body-including
genes-under
any
circumstances, is morally obliged to reject this compromise.
This is not a question of individual human dignity, but of
collective human dignity."7 2 The compromise directive died in
March 1995, when the European Parliament voted 240 to 188
against approval, with twenty-three abstentions."
But the European biotechnology industry was growing,
eager to prevent the kind of ethical issues raised by Rifkin, the
European Greens, and their allies that would serve to block
entirely the establishment
of a patent policy for
biotechnological inventions. Interpharma, an association
representing Swiss pharmaceutical companies, supported
patents on genes or gene fragments "in a form that does not
occur in nature," arguing that "isolated genes do not occur
naturally, nor do large quantities of purified proteins; they
should, therefore, be patentable."7 4 In Germany, biotechnology
had been lagging. By 1996, the political winds had shifted and
the federal government began offering financial incentives to
encourage German biotechnology." As Maria Leptin, head of
the genetics faculty at the University of Cologne, argued, "[Ilf
there's anything that's more important [to Germans] than
saving the environment, it's saving jobs. As soon as people saw
the [pharmaceutical] industry possibly disappearing, morality
went out the window."7 6
In the summer of 1997, the European Parliament
reconsidered the question of patenting biological inventions.7 7
In the spring of 1998, it approved a wide-ranging directive on
biotechnology designed to encourage patents while adopting
71Id.
72 Id.

Dickson, supra note 12, at 103.
David Dickson, European Patent Directive in Critical Test Over Genes,
372 NATURE 310 (1994).
75 Steven Dickman, Germany Joins the Biotech Race, 274 Sci.
1454,
1454-55 (1996).
76 Id.

7 Nigel Williams, European ParliamentBacks New Biopatent Guidelines,
277
SCI., 472 (1997); Alison Abbott, Euro-Vote Lifts Block on Biotech Patents...But
ParliamentWants Closer Scrutiny, 388 NATURE 314, 314-15 (1997).
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explicit ethical restrictions-for the first time anywhere-on
what can be patented." Holding that biotechnology patents
must safeguard the dignity and integrity of the person, the
directive prohibits patents on human parts, human embryos,
and the products of human cloning. 9 The directive also
prohibits patents on animals if what they suffer by being
modified exceeds the benefits that the modification would

yield. 80
The ethical restrictions stopped short of limiting patents
on genes and gene fragments. The directive, passed by the
Parliament and formally issued by the European Commission
in July 1998, authorizes patents for partial DNA sequences
that are isolated from the body and for which an "industrial
application"--that is, a practical use-has been disclosed.
Nevertheless-again, for the first time anywhere-the
directive calls for ongoing oversight of "all ethical aspects of
biotechnology" by the Commission's European Group on Ethics
in Science and New Technologies.8
V.

PATENTS AND THE HUMAN GENOME

In the United States in December 1997, Jeremy Rifkin
and the biologist Stewart Newman announced that, as a
provocation, they would seek a patent on methods to create a
human/animal hybrid, a creature part animal and part
person.82 Bruce Lehman, the U.S. Commissioner of Patents,
declared that the Patent and Trademark Office would in
general reject patents that were "injurious to the well-being,

7 Alison Abbott, Transgenic Patents a Step Closer in Europe, 390 NATURE 429
(1997); Alison Abbott, Europe's Life Patent Moratorium May Go, 393 NATURE 200
(1998).
7, European Community, Directive 98144/EC
of the European Parliamentand

of the Council of 6 July 1998, On the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
213 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COiMiUNITIES, 13-21 (1998) [hereinafter

European Community, Directive].
For example, a mouse genetically engineered to suffer physically from birth
would not be patentable if the modification did not lead to greater medical
understanding, therapies, or cures.
8'European Community, Directive, supranote 79.
"David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Human/Animal
Chimaeras,392 NATURE 423 (1998).
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good policy or good morals of society."83 Patent lawyers roundly
attacked Lehman, contending that because United States
patent law is literally amoral Lehman had no legal authority to
back such a prohibition.' Yet even if ethics has no rightful
presence in American patent policy, an ethical principle-that
the human genome must not be locked up-has been creeping
into the discussion through the issue of gene patenting. And
nothing has done more to introduce it than the robust
ambitions of Craig Venter.
In May 1998, Venter announced that he would leave the
non-profit TIGR to move to a new, for-profit company, called
Celera, that would be located next door, in Rockville,
Maryland.8 5 Celera would aim to sequence all the DNA in the
human genome by 2001, using rapid new automated machines
supplied by its principal owner, the Perkin-Elmer
Corporation. Venter declared that Celera would make all its
sequence data publicly available while at the same time earn
money from selling access to the information.87 Venter's rapidfire approach to sequencing prompted scientific critics to
predict that his company's data would contain numerous
serious gaps.88 It was also unclear how the company could
publish and profit from its sequence data. Early in 2000,
strategies that Celera said it would follow to profit from its
work appeared to threaten broad access to the sequence
information. 8 Indeed, suspicion of Celera's intentions appeared
to prompt President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair's
declaration that information about human DNA sequences
should be released into the public domain.
But Venter has revived his original goal of wholesale
gene patenting. Along with several other genomic companies,
Celera has proposed to use ESTs to identify new genes and
Meredith Wadman, ... As U.S. Office Claims Right to Rule on Morality,
393 NATURE 200 (1998).
Id.; Dickson, supra note 82, at 423.
Eliot Marshall & Elizabeth Pennisi, Hubris and the Human Genome, 280
SCIENCE 994, 994-95 (1998); J. Craig Venter et al., Shotgun Sequencing of the Human
Genome, 280 SCIENCE 1540, 1540-42 (1998).
See authority cited supra note 85.
87Venter, supra note 85, at 1541.
Marshall & Pennisi, supra note 85, at 994-95.
89 Eliot Marshall, Talks of Public-PrivateDeal End in Acrimony, 287 SCi. 1723,
1723-25 (2000).
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guess at their function through computerized searches of the
genomic data base. The company would then seek utility
patents covering these genes, arguing that their functions were
likely the same as those of the genes with similar structure.0
That strategy stimulated a forceful statement in late March by
Aaron Klug and Bruce Alberts, the presidents, respectively, of
the Royal Society of London and the National Academy of
Sciences in the United States.9 They called guessing at gene
function by computerized searches of genomic databases "a
trivial matter."9 2 Its outcome might satisfy "current
93
shareholders' interests," but it did "not serve society well."
Holding that its results did not warrant patent protection, they
stressed that "the human genome itself must be freely
available to all humankind."'
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, however, flatly
disagrees, judged by its current policy on the patenting of
genes and DNA sequences. At the end of 1999, it invited public
comments on that policy and subsequently received them from
thirty-five individuals and seventeen organizations.9 5 Some of
the comments were ethical, echoing those of Alberts and Krug;
some were legal or practical, raising objections, for example, to
granting patents on DNA sequences such as ESTs by arguing
that they should not be patentable because they exist in
nature.96 In January 2001, the Patent Office found reasons to
refuse to incorporate any of the comments in its policies.
Indeed, its responses to the comments in effect promulgated a
policy governing the patentabilty of genes and DNA sequences
that is enormously broadY.

"0Author's conversation with Rebecca Eisenberg, Professor of Law, University
of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich., Mar. 20, 2000.

91 Bruce Alberts & Sir Aaron Kug, The Human Genome Itself Must be Freely

Available to All Humankind,404 NATURE 325 (2000).
92Id.
93

Id.
9 Id.
95 Revised Utility Examination Guidelines: Request for Comments, 64 FED.
REG. 71440 (Dec. 21, 1999). I am indebted to Professor Hal Edgar, Columbia
University Law School, for calling my attention to this request for comments and the
outcome cited below.
9' Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 FED. REG. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
97Id.
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CONCLUSION

Gene patenting has exposed a conflict and, possibly, an
incompatibility in patent policy between the United States and
the European community. Even though the former does not
impose ethical constraints on the patentability of products, the
latter does, with the consequence that what may be patentable
in the United States may not be so in Europe. Paradoxically,
while trade barriers have been steadily falling with
globalization, at least in the commerce of living organisms and
their parts, patent barriers may be arising to some degree. The
transatlantic mismatch aside, within both the United States
and Europe, gene patenting has prompted important
challenges to the scope of intellectual property rights in genes.
Given that the human genome is widely regarded as a common
birthright of people everywhere, governments may feel
increasing pressure to limit the property rights sought in DNA
sequences.

